For nearly a decade, Tri-Valley CAREs, along with colleague organizations Nuclear Watch New Mexico and Savannah River Site Watch have used the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to request the Annual Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs) for National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) nuclear weapons sites. Due to our requests, the agency now posts these reports on its website for public viewing; otherwise the details of these reports would remain secret.
These sites are all managed by private contractors, like Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS), who must meet certain milestones and criteria every year in order to earn performance bonuses. LLNS was eligible for $48,097,075 of bonuses in Fiscal Year 2024 if it met all milestones and criteria without any performance or safety problems; it earned 92% of that, or $44,417,650. Despite achieving an A- for overall performance, some concerning ongoing deficiencies were identified.
Frustratingly, the 2024 PERs identified problems that multiple previous LLNS PERs also pointed out. For example, it states LLNS, “continues to struggle to complete material accounting and analysis due to operational inadequacies in staffing and equipment,” going on to mention that, “LLNS is working to address safety culture challenges identified in one directorate.”
Quality assurance of vendors and materials, materials accounting (for things like high explosives), and “safety basis submittal quality” have been an identified problem at the Lab for years, creating concerns around safety culture. While unspecific in its description, the PERs confirm that these dangerous conditions persist.
W80-4 & W87-1 Warhead Delays and Potential Cost Overruns
LLNS manages the Lab’s major nuclear warhead development programs, the W80-4 (warhead for bomber mounted Long Range Stand Off missiles) and the W87-1 (for the new Sentinel Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles), both of which are noted to be running into problems that are resulting scheduling delays and potential missed milestones according to the PERs. This is significant because delays in a weapons program development almost always lead to cost overruns.
The PERs notes “several late design issues on the W80-4 that have the potential to impact First Production Unit and rate production.” This includes “Insensitive High Explosives supply chain issues [that] are impacting the W80-4” as well as design issues with “the W80-4 MC5108 and Porcula components.” (Porcula is the LLNL team tasked with developing W80-4 components).
The PERs suggests, “Continued focus is needed in partnership with the production agency and Federal Program Office on Porcula down select scope and schedule to minimize impacts to rate production.” It goes on to say that, “Leadership should continue to drive programs to a more focused and disciplined approach to resolving lingering design issues on multiple components and avoid program schedule impacts for the W80-4.”
The PERs notes that the same problem with “Insensitive High Explosives supply chain issues are impacting the W87- 1,” development. It then specifies that, “Design definition, hardware and system tests are behind baseline schedule, driving overall cost and execution risk,” for the W87-1. Further, “Some system tests are delayed relative to the First Production Unit date in the original baseline.”
The PERs offers without detail that LLNS is working “to develop recovery plans for the W87-1.” While significant attention has been paid to delays and cost overruns for the Sentinel Missile that will use the W87-1 warhead, the same scrutiny has not been applied to the delays and potential cost overruns of the warhead. The PERs reveals that it is time decision makers pay attention.
Livermore’s Role in Plutonium Pit Production Touted
While LLNS generally downplays the Lab’s role in new plutonium pit production. The PERs touts the fact that in 2024, LLNS “collaborated with Kansas City National Security Site and Los Alamos National Laboratory to re-establish [plutonium] pit production capabilities resulting in the First Production Unit (FPU) of the W87-1 pit.”
It goes on to specify that, “LLNS used modeling and simulation results to revise requirements that resolved production challenges and successfully delivered the final Quality Evaluation Releases ahead of schedule. LLNS worked aggressively to balance risks to FPU, including reallocating resources and adjusting schedules to maximize the opportunities for success. LLNS supported the LANL production agency with rapid reviews of Quality Evaluation Releases data, adjudication of design definition updates, and disposition of non-conformances necessary to achieve FPU.”
The PERs further extolls LLNS’ “Pit Product Realization Team” for successfully overcoming” a key production challenge” to “deliver three of the best pits made to date and significantly reduced technical risk for FPU.”
The PERs stresses that LLNS’ efforts were essential for the ability of the agency to “restore pit production capabilities to the nation,” and credited LLNS completing “the Quality Evaluation Releases for the FPU pit” that the “Los Alamos Field Office applied the diamond stamp.”
Clearly, LLNS is deeply involved in supporting plutonium pit production at LANL, and it is the major reason for Livermore’s proposed change from Security Category III to II to support “Enhanced Plutonium Utilization” at its Plutonium Facility.
Click here for the full LLNS PERs
Click here for the NNSA’s Site for all of the Site PERs