The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) is an independent source of technical oversight of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) defense nuclear facilities. Tri-Valley CAREs has previously reported on the struggles that DNFSB is currently facing, including oversight challenges, rulemaking changes, and more. These challenges come at a time where DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are actively pushing for an expansion of the nuclear weapons complex, advocating for new nuclear weapons and increased plutonium pit production. The technical oversight that DNFSB is tasked with is more important than ever.
Thus, Tri-Valley CAREs has developed a plan for congressional action (detailed below), all focused on supporting DNFSB and its nuclear safety mission.
Why Congressional Action is Needed NOW!
In 1988, Congress established the DNFSB with the goal of protecting the health and safety of the public and defense nuclear facility employees across the nuclear weapons complex. The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) gives the Board various functions and powers to carry out its mission, including (but not limited to): reviewing and evaluating DOE standards and requirements; investigating events and practices that may affect the public health and safety; analyzing design and operational data; reviewing facility design and construction; and making recommendations to the Secretary of Energy. Under this enabling legislation, the Board additionally possesses the authority to hold hearings, establish reporting requirements, assign resident inspectors to DOE defense nuclear facilities, conduct special studies, and evaluate information concerning events, practices, standards, and research.
The AEA requires that the Secretary of Energy, “fully cooperate in providing prompt and unfettered access to facilities, personnel, and information as the Board considers necessary to carry out its oversight responsibilities in support of the safe execution of DOE’s vital national security and radioactive waste cleanup missions.” DOE has largely abided by this requirement since the Board’s inception in 1988, though significant challenges were experienced in 2021. Consequently, Congress directed DNFSB and DOE to develop a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), aimed at creating a process by which the two agencies could work together moving forward to ensure that DNFSB is able to access the materials necessary to fulfill its oversight mission. This MOU was finalized in 2022, but DNFSB alleges that many of the access denials it currently faces are “inconsistent with the approved MOU.”
In July of 2026, DNFSB’s Report to Congress on Denials of Information reported that it is currently experiencing the “most significant” access challenges in its history. Read about these challenges in Tri-Valley CAREs blog post from last month. When DNFSB cannot obtain information or attend activities that it deems necessary to carry out its statutory mission, the independent oversight framework Congress established is impaired.
DNFSB Report Out + Project Velocity
DOE Circulated an Internal Memorandum Directing Sites to Violate the Atomic Energy Act
On March 10, 2026, DOE issued a memorandum entitled “Clarifying Instructions Regarding Interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board” (Enclosure D) to DOE and NNSA field offices. After reviewing the memorandum, DNFSB alleged multiple provisions within it to be inconsistent with congressional intent, longstanding DOE directives acknowledging the Board’s authority, and the AEA as a whole. DNFSB remains concerned that this memorandum is likely to impair its ability to carry out its oversight mission, and additionally believes that DOE personnel have cited the memorandum as justification for limited Board access and failing to respond to requests.
DNFSB cites four primary concerns with regard to DOE’s memorandum:
- The memorandum appears to permit DOE to determine whether DNFSB has jurisdiction over a matter, and to deny access on that basis.
- The memorandum directs DOE and NNSA not to provide DNFSB with predecisional or draft copies of standards, regulations, orders, requirements, or executive deliberative information, and asserts that the Board’s authority is limited to “currently applicable” standards.
- The memorandum appears to misconstrue the statutory provision concerning atomic-weapons information.
- The memorandum directs DOE and NNSA field offices not to provide access when officials believe a Board request “may be outside” the Board’s statutory authority, instead directing personnel to elevate those requests for internal review.
DNFSB Currently Lacks Quorum Due to Congressional and Trump Administration Inaction
As of October, 2025, DNFSB no longer has a quorum. The Board is meant to host a five member panel of nuclear safety experts, and to operate in its full oversight capacity, must have a quorum of at least 3 members. Additionally, DNFSB is required to maintain a sense of political equilibrium (equal number of Democrats and Republicans). Board members are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Unfortunately, as of October 2025, the Board is down to just one sitting member, radiation protection and nuclear safety expert Patricia Lee, a democratic nomination. Neither President Trump nor Senate Republicans have made any push to nominate or confirm a new board member since quorum was lost.
Independent Oversight of the Weapons Complex is More Important than Ever
As previously referenced, DOE is currently advocating for and working towards an modernization of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, with interest in new nuclear weapons and increased plutonium pit production. Independent oversight is crucial at such a time, where DOE is pursuing significant rulemaking changes to the policies, procedures, and requirements governing its nuclear weapons complex. For example, the Modernizing DOE Operative Directives Initiative (F.K.A. “Project Velocity”) is an ambitious effort to rewrite dozens of internal directives governing the safety, construction, and oversight processes across U.S. defense nuclear facilities.
As discussed in a blog post last month, on September 16, 2026, Representative Marcy Kaptur (D-OH) and Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) wrote a letter to Secretary of Energy Chris Wright with regard to the aforementioned initiative, “calling out the dozens of changes being made to operating directives at DOE, which [are] jeopardizing the safety of work being done at DOE labs.”
For Tri-Valley CAREs in particular, independent nuclear safety oversight is directly relevant to the health and safety of the public and employees who live near and work at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). DNFSB was established precisely to protect such communities, only able to carry out its oversight mission if it has access to the facilities, personnel, meetings, and information necessary to perform its work.
In light of this information, Tri-Valley CAREs supports the following requests to Congress, listed below. These actions do not require Congress to create a new oversight body or provide a new source of funding. In fact, President Trump’s FY2027 Budget Request provides full funding for DNFSB. The primary concern is ensuring that the Board has the access, independence, and membership necessary to use the resources Congress provides to fulfill the mission Congress assigned to it.
Plan of Action for Congress to Support the DNFSB
- Reaffirm the DNFSB’s statutory access authority.
Congress should make clear that the DNFSB must have the prompt and unfettered access to DOE defense nuclear facilities, personnel, meetings, and information that the Atomic Energy Act requires for the Board to carry out its statutory responsibilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 2286c(a).
- Require DOE to correct its March 10, 2026 memorandum.
Congress should direct DOE to issue and circulate a new memorandum correcting the March 10, 2026 memorandum and reiterating to DOE and NNSA field and site personnel the DNFSB’s statutory authorities, including the Board’s authority to obtain prompt and unfettered access to the information, facilities, personnel, meetings, and activities it determines are necessary to carry out its statutory responsibilities.
- Require DOE to resolve the access denials identified by the DNFSB.
Congress should require DOE to provide timely responses to outstanding DNFSB information requests and resolve the explicit and constructive denials documented in the Board’s July 2026 Report to Congress on Access Denials.
- Protect the DNFSB’s independent ability to determine what it needs to conduct oversight.
Congress should ensure that DOE does not substitute its own determination of what information or activities are necessary for the Board’s independent judgment concerning what it requires to fulfill its statutory responsibilities.
- Require DOE to adhere to the existing DOE-DNFSB agreements.
Congress should require DOE to adhere to the February 2022 Memorandum of Understanding and June 2022 Supplementary Agreement governing communication, coordination, information sharing, access, and resolution of disputes between the agencies, and to explain any departures from their provisions.
- Restore a quorum on the DNFSB.
Congress should urge the President to promptly nominate qualified candidates to fill the vacant DNFSB positions and urge the Senate to promptly consider and confirm any nominees submitted for those positions. A fully constituted Board is important to its ability to exercise the full range of authorities Congress has assigned to it.
- Conduct congressional oversight of DOE restrictions on DNFSB access.
Congress should examine the restrictions on DNFSB access, the legal basis for DOE’s interpretation of the Board’s statutory authorities, and the relationship between those restrictions and the ongoing changes associated with Project Velocity.
As always, Tri-Valley CAREs will continue to monitor any changes made either within DOE or from a congressional standpoint, and will provide updates on any impacts to the functionality of DNFSB. Please see the slide deck attached to this blog post for more information on DNFSB and the access challenges it is facing.