Tri-Valley CAREs
Communities Against a Radioactive Environment
Thursday, March 01, 2007
Make It Or Break It
By: Charles D. Ferguson and Lisa Obrentz
Published In: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Subtitle:
The weapons labs built the
Bomb. Now they?re tasked
with finding ways to get rid
of it. Trouble is, old habits
die hard.
In August 1945, nuclear weapon scientists became heroes. The U.S.
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki signaled the end to a long
and bloody world war.
The scientific expertise that gave birth to the Bomb has also helped secure
nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials. During the Manhattan
Project, the United States sent scientists throughout Europe to stop
Nazi Germany from building the Bomb. This dual role continued throughout
the Cold War, as the national weapons laboratories maintained the U.S. nuclear deterrent while simultaneously
developing the means to
verify the arms control treaties that
imposed a degree of stability on the
superpower arms race.
Following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the labs announced that they
would place a renewed emphasis on
ramping up nonproliferation programs.
Certainly, events in subsequent
years have validated the need for
such efforts. Three additional nations
(India, Pakistan, and North Korea)
have joined the nuclear club, with potentially
dozens of others?including
terrorist organizations?waiting in
the wings. Yet, recent developments
raise concerns about the labs? commitment
to this mission. The weapons
designers are back on the job, tasked
with developing a new generation of
warheads that is said to be vital to
sustaining the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
The labs themselves see no conflict of
interest, arguing that nonproliferation
divisions benefit from the expertise
of their weapons-making colleagues.
But others worry that weapons work
compromises the integrity of these
efforts and diverts resources from halting
the spread of nuclear weapons.
Wanting to probe this question further,
last year we interviewed several
senior scientists and analysts at three
weapons laboratories: Los Alamos
National Laboratory and Sandia National
Laboratories in New Mexico,
and Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory in California.1 In addition,
we sought out the perspectives
of watchdog groups: Western States
Legal Foundation, the Los Alamos
Study Group, and Tri-Valley Communities
Against a Radioactive Environment
(CAREs). Throughout our
conversations, we wondered: Can the
nonproliferation divisions at the labs
fully serve the greater good if they remain
steeped in a culture that creates
weapons of mass destruction?
SERVING THE GREATER GOOD
At the weapons labs, several hundred
people work on nonproliferation and
homeland security, operating under a
budget that, in recent years, amounts
to several hundred million dollars
annually. The Energy Department?s
National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) remains the nonproliferation
divisions? primary sponsor, although
they also receive support from
the State Department, the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, the Department
of Homeland Security, and some
foreign government agencies.
The labs have long been at the forefront
of verifying compliance with
arms control treaties by developing
technologies that can detect the signatures
of a nuclear detonation: X-rays,
gamma rays, radio-frequency neutrons,
charged-particle radiations, and
seismic waves. In fact, Los Alamos?s
first major arms control initiative was
the design of the Vela satellite, which
monitored gamma ray bursts to detect
atmospheric nuclear weapons tests
following the ratification of the 1963
Limited Test Ban Treaty.
Since 9/11, Homeland Security support
has allowed the labs to branch
out from their traditional nuclear
nonproliferation work. Los Alamos,
for example, has developed a radiological
emergency response project, which is improving decontamination
technologies and is educating first responders
about preparing for ?dirty
bomb? attacks. Complementing this
project, Livermore makes its National
Atmospheric Release Advisory Center
available to first responders to model
the dispersal of radioactive materials.
In addition, the labs continue to devote
considerable resources to nuclear
security activities, including the Material
Protection, Control, and Accounting
Program to protect nuclear materials
in the former Soviet Union, and forensics
analysis to help trace the origin of
materials used in nuclear or radiological
weapons. Nuclear safeguards training
and analysis are the ?heart and
soul? of Los Alamos?s nonproliferation
work, according to one senior Los
Alamos official. For example, the lab
trains all International Atomic Energy
Agency inspectors in nondestructive
assay techniques and supports export
control analysis at the Nuclear Suppliers
Group. Sandia has used its cooperative
monitoring centers to educate
foreign officials about safeguards, as
well as other security issues. Livermore
has created a computer program that
allows inspectors to understand how
proliferators could try to spoof monitoring
systems in a uranium enrichment
or plutonium reprocessing plant.
Still, lab safeguards groups have
faced funding shortfalls. One analyst
said that his lab had developed
a conceptual model of how to monitor
the uranium enrichment level in
individual centrifuge machines. But a
lack of money has held back further
development of this tool, which could
in theory provide the means for cooperative
continuous inspection of Iran?s
enrichment plant.
AXIS OF PROLIFERATION
These efforts serve U.S. interests by
limiting ?horizontal? proliferation?
the spread of nuclear weapons to
countries that do not already have
them. Yet, there is also ?vertical?
proliferation, more commonly known
as arms races, when nations build up
their existing nuclear arsenals.
Each concept lies on a separate
axis, but they inevitably intersect. The
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) encompasses a grand bargain
whereby nations pledge to foreswear
the development of nuclear weapons
if the existing nuclear weapon states,
including the United States, pursue
complete nuclear disarmament.
The NPT does not specify when
disarmament must be accomplished?
a fact that was a key source of gridlock
at the May 2005 NPT Review
Conference. While many non-nuclear
weapon states wanted to concentrate
on this issue, the United States sought
to deflect attention from the charge
that it has made little or no progress
on disarmament. Lab policy analysts
pitched in by drafting a glossy brochure
that argued the United States
has been fulfilling its disarmament
commitment.
Lab officials we spoke with pointed
to the substantial reduction in the U.S.
nuclear arsenal since the end of the
Cold War as evidence of America?s
good intentions. Around 1990, the
United States had about 20,000 warheads,
and today, it has cut that number
roughly in half. And the Bush administration
has announced plans to further
reduce the stockpile to approximately
6,000 warheads by 2012.
The labs also place tremendous
faith in the Reliable Replacement
Warhead (RRW) Program, which
has spurred considerable controversy
since Congress initiated it in
late 2004. The program is billed as
replacing existing weapons, and officials
claim that it could allow for
further reductions in the stockpile
because the new weapons? high reliability
would lessen the need to keep
a large number of reserve warheads.
The program would also add security
features to the warheads to guard
against terrorist tampering. Officials
believe that the program would not
need nuclear testing to ensure that the
new warheads work. Moreover, they
argue that RRW would strengthen
deterrence by convincing adversaries
that the United States has highly reliable
warheads, theoretically making
use of the weapons less likely.
Today, Energy is pushing toward
an ambitious makeover of the labs.
The plan, called Complex 2030, envisions
completely replacing the current
stockpile with an RRW stockpile
by 2030. If all goes as expected, this
would result in a smaller arsenal and
a smaller number of sites holding
weapons-usable nuclear material that
could be vulnerable to theft. Although
this transformation would require
considerable up-front costs, Energy estimates
that in the long term Complex
2030 would save more money.
A not-so-hidden stimulus for the
RRW program was the perceived need
to provide new work for weapons
scientists. Commenting on the excitement
of an RRW design competition
between Los Alamos and Livermore,
Joseph Martz, the leader of the Los Alamos design team, said, ?I have had
people working nights and weekends.
I have to tell them to go home. I can?t
keep them out of the office.?2
Although the nonproliferation lab
experts we talked to seemed very
dedicated to their work, they did
not exhibit as much unbridled enthusiasm
as their colleagues on the
weapons design teams. Perhaps the
primary difference is that the weaponeers,
after a long dry spell, now
have, to use J. Robert Oppenheimer?s
words, a ?technically sweet? project
to whet their appetites. There is a joy
in having the opportunity to learn
something new. As one of us who has
worked at Los Alamos knows, there
is another thrill at play: Weapons
work bestows a great sense of power.
This situation will persist unless, as
philosopher William James observed
in his 1906 essay, ?The Moral Equivalent
of War,? anti-militarists endow
their labors with the glories and disciplines
associated with preparation for
war. In U.S. society, the value placed
on someone?s labors often correlates
with the money bestowed on their
activities. The Natural Resources Defense
Council estimates that the Bush
administration is spending ?more than
12 times as much on nuclear weapons
research and production activities as
it is on urgent global nonproliferation
efforts to retrieve, secure, and dispose
of weapons materials worldwide.?3
Despite dining off the table scraps at
the weapons complex banquet, senior
lab nonproliferation officials emphatically
told us that their programs have
benefited from having access to weapons
designers and nuclear materials
near their offices. For instance, the
nonproliferation lab groups supplied
technical advisers to the six-party talks
with North Korea and to the teams
working to dismantle Libya?s nuclear
program. Having access to weapons
designers also facilitated a detailed assessment
of the nuclear bomb design
Libya obtained from the A. Q. Khan
network.
BAIT AND SWITCH
From the perspective of the labs,
there is no inherent conflict of interest
between efforts to prevent nuclear
proliferation abroad while pursuing a
potentially multibillion-dollar effort to
reduce the existing U.S. nuclear stockpile
through new warhead designs.
But others see nonproliferation as
inherently incompatible with what remains
the core mission of the labs: developing
weapons of mass destruction.
The debate was thrown into sharp relief
when, in 2000, chemist Andreas Toupadakis
resigned from Livermore. He had
joined the lab with promises of working
on its environmental programs but
soon became disenchanted when he was
drawn into weapons work. In a public
letter explaining his resignation, he
wrote: ?We, the scientists, have tried to
justify our involvement in building and
maintaining nuclear arsenals by claiming
that we are doing it for peace. How
can we have peace when, by our work
on weapons, we are raising fear in the
hearts of those who do not have the
same technology for killing? . . . Those
who work on environmental projects or
nonproliferation projects at the nuclear
labs have not realized that such a thing
is an illusion.?4 One year later, computer
scientist Isaac Trotts also resigned from
Livermore when he learned that a computer
simulation project he was working
on?ostensibly to help prevent nuclear
warheads from accidentally detonating
or polluting the environment with
radioactive material?also supported
efforts to enhance the nuclear-capable
B61 warhead?s ability to penetrate underground
targets.5
While opponents of continued
weapons work recognize that this
knowledge can potentially increase
the effectiveness of programs to prevent
proliferation or nuclear terrorism,
they believe that such activity
would provide only marginal insight
as to how proliferators or terrorist
groups would build nuclear weapons.
The 60-plus years of weapons
work at the labs is sufficient to understand
those threats. We share that
assessment because the major hurdle
for either a nation-state or a stateless
terrorist group to make nuclear
weapons is acquiring the necessary
amounts of highly enriched uranium
or plutonium. Understanding how to
stop this acquisition does not depend
on continued production of nuclear
weapons in the United States.
Of all the labs? work, the RRW
Program and its associated claims
of reducing the U.S. arsenal has especially
outraged watchdog groups.
Marylia Kelley, executive director of
Tri- Valley CAREs, deems the RRW
Program a ?bait and switch? because,
?It was advertised as making existing
weapons more reliable but in fact
new weapons are being designed.?
She adds, ?The second generation bait
and switch will be the need for a final
proof test.? Trying to counter government
claims, Tri-Valley CAREs commissioned
a report by Robert Civiak,
a physicist who had worked as a U.S.
government policy analyst. Their January
2006 report argues that the RRW
Program might lower the threshold of
nuclear weapon use because ?it is impossible
for this Congress to prevent
future administrations from assigning
those new warheads to new missions.?
6 Civiak further asserts that the
current arsenal is already highly safe,
secure, and reliable.
Watchdog groups are not won over
by claims of spending reductions,
particularly since the Secretary
of Energy Advisory
Board underscored the large
uncertainties in the Complex
2030 cost estimate, which
ranges between $155 billion
and $175 billion.7 That
skepticism is also apparent
in Congress, where Republican
Cong. David Hobson
of Ohio, who serves on
the House Appropriations
Committee, recently issued
a stern warning over the
spiraling costs of Complex
2030. ?RRW is a deal with
Congress, but the deal requires
a serious effort by the
department to modernize,
consolidate, and downsize
the weapons complex,? he
wrote in a letter to Energy
Secretary Samuel Bodman.
?Absent that effort, there is
no deal.?8
In an attempt to rein in the
labs, Tri-Valley CAREs partnered
with Nuclear Watch
New Mexico, another watchdog
group, to submit in 2005
a proposal to become the new management
team of Los Alamos. The coalition
wanted to change the ?overall
direction of future missions? at the
lab by downgrading the lab?s nuclear
weapons programs and subordinating
them under a new associate directorship
of nuclear nonproliferation. The
goal was to ensure that commitments
under the NPT are met. Jay Coghlan,
executive director of Nuclear Watch
New Mexico, and Tri-Valley CAREs?
Kelley would have also discontinued
work on new weapons designs. They
would have shifted substantial resources
toward non-nuclear programs
at the lab and elevated to the highest
priority work on ?resolution of longterm
national security needs such as
energy independence, conservation,
and global climate change.?9 In late
2005, Energy rejected this management
bid, and in January 2007, it disqualified
a more recent proposal that
Coghlan and Kelley submitted to run
Lawrence Livermore because ?their
proposal did not meet the criteria
for running the lab,? according to an
NNSA spokesman.10
Proponents of a robust U.S. nuclear
arsenal would probably not give
the watchdogs? proposal a second
thought because they would view it
as ?anti-nuclear.? But a closer look
may point to some common ground.
While Kelley confirms that she is
strongly in favor of irreversible nuclear
dismantlement, she has accepted
a need for maintaining a ?custodial
role? for nuclear weapons activities
during the transition to a nuclear
weapon?free world.
MIXED MESSAGES
Greg Mello, the director of the Los
Alamos Study Group, a nuclear disarmament
organization based in Albuquerque,
New Mexico, recommends
that the nonproliferation divisions
?hire people who favor nuclear disarmament?
to help the labs ?break out
of a mental straitjacket.? But
watchdog groups also recognize
that changing the culture
of the labs ultimately depends
upon broader changes in U.S.
policies. While lab officials cite
the post-Cold War decline in
U.S. warheads as evidence of a
U.S. commitment to reducing
nuclear tensions, this tells only
part of the story. A more critical
indicator is the value that
the U.S. government places on
nuclear weapons. In this regard,
the Bush administration?s
2001 Nuclear Posture Review
signaled a mixed message.
On the one hand, it called for
more capable conventional
weapons systems to make the
United States ?less dependent?
on nuclear weapons for its ?offensive
deterrent capability.?
On the other hand, the review
recommended reestablishing
?advanced warhead concepts
teams at each of the national
laboratories.? While the review
welcomed the goal of shifting
down to between 1,700 and
2,200 deployed strategic nuclear warheads
by 2012, it warned that ?unexpected
contingencies? demand that the
United States maintain nuclear forces
for the foreseeable future.
The task of cultivating a mindset
that would devalue U.S. nuclear
weapons is made difficult by a revolving
door that allows lab employees
to spend months or years at a
time in Washington helping to write
policy briefs. Mello noted that ?few
people in Congress have power over
the labs? and added that ?the lab
directors are protected? because of
their ties to U.S. Strategic Command
(Stratcom), which has recently expanded
its mission beyond nuclear
deterrence to include combating unconventional
weapons worldwide.
The nonproliferation divisions, he
says, have strayed from ?true? nonproliferation
work and supported
Stratcom?s new mission by doing targeting
and nodal analysis of Iranian
nuclear facilities.
Lab watchdogs believe that arms
control analysis is best done at the
State Department because that agency
has the vested authority to ensure
that the United States is meeting its
treaty obligations. But the State Department?s
elimination of its arms
control bureau during a recent reorganization
has left a vacuum that it
has filled by contracting out some of
this analytic work to the labs. The
critics, in general, would prefer a robust
firewall erected between the labs
and the policy shops in Washington.
The labs, however, bristle at the
accusation of political manipulation.
A senior lab official asserted that the
nonproliferation divisions ?support
policy but do not make it.? He added,
?Management of the lab was set up
to buffer the division from political
leaders.? A lab analyst added that the
labs ?have to remain independent to
tell the customer [government] what is
wrong.? Another scientist believes the
desired relationship between the labs
and government should be that ?the
government tells the labs what needs
to happen and that each lab has its
own mission space to accomplish the
goals government has selected for it.?
Still, some personnel see the current
relationship as too personality driven
and too riddled with micromanagement.
For example, they pointed to
the Material Protection, Control,
and Accounting Program as having
put the labs in an overly competitive
environment. A senior lab scientist
said that Energy ?picked individuals
from separate labs and threw them
together in nonhomogeneous teams,
creating a conflict of interest.? For
decades, the labs have felt the push
and pull of competition and cooperation.
The government formed Livermore
under the belief that competition
with Los Alamos would produce
creative tension and result in better
work. (During the Cold War, a Livermore
scientist posted a sign that declared:
?Remember, the Soviets are
the competition, Los Alamos is the
enemy.?) There are indications that
the competitiveness continues today.
We witnessed a contemporary clash
in perspectives at Los Alamos and
Sandia. Each views itself as doing the
best in working with other nonproliferation
divisions. As the oldest of
the labs, Los Alamos ?sees itself as a
natural leader,? according to a senior
scientist. A Sandia analyst believes
her lab ?is unique in looking at the
interstitial space between policy and
technology? and ?does the best job
at reaching out? to other labs.
However, a senior nonproliferation
official told us that the competition is
?mostly friendly.? While the nonproliferation
divisions at the three weapons
labs overlap in their capabilities,
each has developed special strengths
to tame competitive tensions. For
instance, Livermore has a distinct
advantage in regional analysis of current
and potential emerging threats.
Taking pride in its outreach capabilities,
Sandia has brought together foreign
scientists and analysts in its cooperative
monitoring centers to help
resolve common security problems.
For example, two security experts
from India and Pakistan recently
wrote a Sandia-sponsored paper assessing
how to prevent nuclear terrorism
in South Asia.
But even if the labs maintain an
atmosphere of creative tension, the
larger question remains: What precisely
are they creating? Nonproliferation
specialists are engaged in a
heroic task?stopping the spread of
nuclear weapons. But they see proliferation
as the inherent problem,
not the security dilemma spawned by
continued possession of these weapons
by the United States and other
nuclear-armed countries.
Lab nonproliferation experts are
steeped in a culture that?more than
six decades after Hiroshima and
Nagasaki?still believes the path to
national security lies in maintaining
America?s competitive nuclear edge.
The ongoing paradox of their work is,
in part, the product of a bureaucracy
that seeks to sustain itself with new
missions after the Cold War. But it is
also a product of the larger paradox
of U.S. policy, which simultaneously
denounces the acquisition of nuclear
weapons abroad while seeking to upgrade
the nuclear deterrent at home.
Though the labs share a common
national security mission, it is, ironically,
this very mission that holds
them back from objectively analyzing
whether nuclear weapons will always
be needed for U.S. security.
Nonproliferation specialists are engaged in a
heroic task?stopping the spread of nuclear
weapons. But they see proliferation as the
inherent problem, not the security dilemma
spawned by continued possession of these
weapons by the United States and others.
Charles D. Ferguson, who worked at Los Alamos National Laboratory during
the summers of 1986 and 1987, is a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations
(CFR); Lisa Obrentz is a CFR research associate in the science and technology
program. The authors thank the Ploughshares Fund for supporting the researching
and writing of this article.
66 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS MARCH/APRIL 2007
FEAR NOT
Continued from p. 37
1. The probability calculation, by astronomer
Alan Harris, is at psweb.sbs.ohio-state
.edu/faculty/jmueller/overblown.html.
2. Bart Kosko, ?Terror Threat May Be
Mostly a Big Bluff,? Los Angeles Times, September
13, 2004, p. B11.
3.Testimony by Mueller can be found at
www.fbi.gov/congress/congress.htm.
4. Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The
Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York:
Times Books, 2004), p. 28.
5. Brigette I. Nacos et al., ?The Threat of
International Terrorism After 9/11? (paper,
American Political Science Association, August
31, 2006); David C. Rapoport, ?Terrorists
and Weapons of the Apocalypse,? National
Security Studies Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 1, p.
50 (1999).
6. Milton J. Leitenberg, Assessing the Biological
Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat
(Carlisle, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College, 2005), pp. 27?28.
Leitenberg notes that those arrested did have
in their possession a readily available book
that contained a recipe for making ricin. If
followed out, the recipe would have yielded
enough poison to kill one person if the substance
were injected.
7. Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine:
Deep Inside America?s Pursuit of Its Enemies
Since 9/11 (New York: Simon and Schuster,
2006), pp. 194?98.
8. Shaun Waterman, ?Cyanide Gas Device
Probably Didn?t Work,? United Press International,
June 25, 2006.
9. Ian Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2006), chap. 5.
10. Eric Lipton, ?Former Antiterror Officials
Find Industry Pays Better,? New York
Times, June 18, 2006, p. A1.
11. Bernard Brodie, ?The Development of
Nuclear Strategy,? International Security, vol.
2, no. 4, p. 83 (1978).
12. Clark R. Chapman and Alan W. Harris,
?A Skeptical Look at September 11th:
How We Can Defeat Terrorism by Reacting
to It More Rationally,? Skeptical Inquirer,
September/October 2002, p. 32.
13. Clark R. Chapman and Alan W. Harris,
?Response,? Skeptical Inquirer, January/
February 2003, p. 65.
14. David Gergen, ?A Fragile Time for
Globalism,? U.S. News and World Report,
February 11, 2002, p. 41; James Carafano
and Paul Rosenzweig, Winning the Long War:
Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism
and Preserving Freedom (Washington,
D.C.: Heritage Books, 2005), p. 93.
15. Interview with Sen. Richard Lugar, Fox
News Sunday, June 15, 2003; Charles Krauthammer,
?Blixful Amnesia,? Washington
Post, July 9, 2004, p. A19; Charles Krauthammer,
?Emergency Over, Saith the Court,?
Washington Post, July 7, 2006, p. A17.
16. Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism:
The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New
York: Times Books, 2004), p. 19.
17. Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism:
The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New
York: Times Books, 2004), p. 191; Michael
Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in
an Age of Terror (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 2004), p. 147.
18. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon,
The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random
House, 2002), pp. 398?99, 418.
19. Marvin R. Shanken, ?General Tommy
Franks: An Exclusive Interview with America?s
Top General in the War on Terrorism,?
Cigar Aficionado, December, 2003; Anonymous
[Michael Scheuer], Imperial Hubris:
Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror
(Dulles, Va.: Brassey?s, 2004), pp. 160, 177,
226, 241, 242, 250, 252, 263.
20. Jennifer C. Kerr, ?Terror Threat Level
Raised to Orange,? Associated Press, December
21, 2003.
21. Michael Ignatieff, ?Lesser Evils: What
It Will Cost Us to Succeed in the War on Terror,?
New York Times Magazine, May 2,
2004, pp. 46?48; Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser
Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
2004), p. 146.
22. Bob Dart, ?Leak Plugged: Toll Estimate
Rises as Water Begins to Fall,? Atlanta
Journal-Constitution, September 6, 2005,
p. 1A. The estimate on September 24, for example,
was that nearly 7,000 had died (New
York Times, September 24, 2001, p. B2)
23. William M. Arkin, ?Goodbye War on Terrorism,
Hello Long War,? Washington Post weblog,
January 26, 2006, blogs.washingtonpost
.com/earlywarning; Gilmore Commission
(Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons
of Mass Destruction), ?First Annual Report: Assessing
the Threat,? December 15, 1999, p. 37.
IN SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH
Continued from p. 44
1. David Harris, The Crisis (New York: Little,
Brown and Company, 2004), pp. 19?21.
2. Steven Erlanger, ?Sharon Suffers Extensive
Stroke and Is Very Grave,? New York
Times, January 5, 2006, p. 1.
3. ?Text of Proclamation Aired on Cuban
Radio,? Miami Herald Online Edition, August
1, 2006.
4. See for example, Jerrold M. Post ed.,
Psychological Assessments of Political Leaders,
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
2003). Dr. Post was the founder of the CIA?s
Center for the Analysis of Personality and
Behavior and has written extensively on this
subject.
5. Leslie R. Pyenson, MD, ?The Physician
and Intelligence Analysis,? (remarks, American
Academy of Psychology and the Law
AAPL 2004 Annual Meeting, Scottsdale, Arizona,
October 22, 2004).
6. Jerrold M. Post and Alexander George,
Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous
World: The Psychology of Political Behavior
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp.
65?67, 80?82.
7. Seth S. King, ?Indonesia Says Plot to Depose
Sukarno Is Foiled by Army Chief,? The
New York Times, October 2, 1965, p. 1.
8. ?The Shah?s Illness and the Fall of Iran,?
Studies in Intelligence, Summer 1980, p. 63.
9. Pyenson, AAPL remarks, October 22,
2004.
10. Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence
Memorandum, Soviet Leaders and Succession,
May 13, 1974, www.foia.ucia.gov.
11. Myles Maxfield and Edward G. Greger,
?VIP Health Watch,? Studies in Intelligence,
Spring 1968, pp. 53?63.
12. Features of this dynamic include: the
nature of the physician?VIP patient relationship;
how the demands of high office compromise
the quality of a leader?s medical care;
and political implications of illness in a given
society. See Jerrold M. Post and Robert S.
Robins, When Illness Strikes the Leader: The
Dilemma of the Captive King (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1993), p. xv.
13. Milos Jenicek and David L. Hitchcock,
Evidence-Based Practice: Logic and Critical
Thinking and Medicine (Chicago: AMA Press,
2005), p. 15.
14. Pyenson, AAPL remarks, October 22,
2004.
15. Pyenson, AAPL remarks, October 22,
2004.
16. Jack Anderson, ?CIA Snoops Study Ailments
of Leaders,? Washington Post, March
1, 1982, p. C13.
17. Walter Pincus, ?Analysts Seek Clues in
Public Silence of Bin Laden; Fugitive May Be
Dead, or Waiting for Dramatic Moment to
Reappear, Timed to Future Attack,? Washington
Post, April 24, 2002, p. A26.
18. ?Bin Laden?s Doctor Disappears,? CBS
News Online, November 14, 2002.
19. James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace
(New York: Penguin Press, 1983), p. 360.
20. Myles Maxfield, Robert Proper, and
Sharol Case, ?Remote Medical Diagnosis,?
Studies in Intelligence, Spring 1979,
pp. 9?14.
21. Ibid., pp. 11?12.
22. Anderson, ?CIA Snoops Study Ailments
of Leaders,? Washington Post.
23. Nicholas Wade, ?Covert Ops Enter the
Genomic Era,? New York Times, April 20,
2003, p. 2.
24. Alyce M. Girardi, Leslie R. Pyenson,
Jon Morris, and Francis X. Brickfield, ?Impact
of Coronary Heart Disease on World
Leaders,? Annals of Internal Medicine, February
20, 2001, pp. 287?290; Francis X.
Brickfield and Leslie R. Pyenson, ?Impact of
Stroke on World Leaders,? Military Medicine,
March 2001, pp. 231?232; Leslie R. Pyenson,
F. X. Brickfield, and L. A. Cove, ?Patterns of
Death in World Leaders,? Military Medicine,
December 1998, pp. 797?800.
MAKE IT OR BREAK IT
Continued from p. 52
1. Participants were willing to speak on the
record if their names were not cited.
2. ?Labs Compete to Make New Nuclear
Bomb,? Associated Press, June 13, 2006.
3. Christopher E. Paine, principal author,
?Weaponeers of Waste,? Natural Resources
Defense Council, April 2004, p. 8, emphasis
in the original.
4. Andreas Toupadakis, ?The Reasons for My
Resignation from Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory,? available at www.trivalleycares
.org.
5. ?Lawrence Livermore Lab Scientist
Quits Over Weapons Work,? Disarmament
Diplomacy, March 2001. MARCH/APRIL 2007 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 67
6. Robert Civiak, ?The Reliable Replacement
Warhead Program: A Slippery Slope to
New Nuclear Weapons,? Tri-Valley CAREs,
January 2006.
7. Secretary of Energy Advisory Board,
Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure
Task Force, ?Recommendations for the
Nuclear Weapons Complex of the Future,?
Draft Final Report, Energy Department, July
13, 2005.
8. James Sterngold, ?Key Legislators Threaten
Funds for Nuclear Weapons Overhaul;
Bush Administration Abandoning Effort to
Consolidate, They Say,? San Francisco Chronicle,
January 14, 2007, p. A4.
9. Nuclear Watch New Mexico and Tri-Valley
CAREs, ?A Joint Proposal for Management
of the Los Alamos National Laboratory,?
July 18, 2005.
10. Ian Hoffman, ?Feds Can Activists? Bid
to Run Nuke Labs,? Oakland Tribune, January
6, 2007.
NUCLEAR NOTEBOOK
Continued from p. 64
1. Essential references for following Russian
strategic nuclear forces include: the START
memorandum of understanding released by the
U.S. and Russian governments twice a year; the
U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service;
Pavel Podvig?s website on Russian strategic
nuclear forces, www.russianforces.org; and the
database ?Russia: General Nuclear Weapons
Developments,? maintained by the Monterey
Institute of International Studies? Center for
Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), www.nti.org/
db/nisprofs/russia/weapons/gendevs.htm.
2. ?Baluyevsky Says Russia To Have ?Thousands?
of Nuclear Warheads by 2010,? Interfax,
July 7, 2006. Yury Baluyevsky is also first
deputy defense minister.
3. Vladimir Putin, ?Annual Address to the
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,?
Moscow, May 10, 2006, www.kremlin.ru/eng/.
4. Vladimir Putin, ?Closing Address at
the Meeting of the Armed Forces? Command
Staff,? Moscow, November 16, 2006, www
.kremlin.ru/eng/.
5. Vladimir Putin, ?Speech at Meeting with
the Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives
of the Russian Federation,? Moscow, June
27, 2006, www.kremlin.ru/eng/.
6. ?Russia to Re-Equip Its New Mobile
ICBMs with Multiple Warheads,? RIA Novosti,
December 15, 2006.
7. An English translation of the paper is
available from CNS, cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/
rusfed.htm.
8. ?Russia Might Tear up ISR [INF] Missile
Treaty?Defense Ministry Source,? RIA Novosti,
August 28, 2006.
9. ?Russia Complains of U.S. Missile Defense
Plans,? Associated Press/International
Herald Tribune, December 13, 2006.
10. ?Russia: Missile Reduction Treaty Will
Not Harm Russia?s Nuclear Potential,? Interfax,
May 17, 2006.
11. ?Transcript of the Press Conference for
the Russian and Foreign Media,? Circular Hall,
the Kremlin, Moscow, January 31, 2006, www
.kremlin.ru/eng/.
12. Andrei Kislyakov, ?The Missile That
Does Not Care,? RIA Novosti, February 14,
2006.
13. ?Baluevski: Rossiiskie Rakety Budut
Preodolevat Luybye PRO? (Baluevski: Russian
Missiles Will Penetrate Any BMD), Strana
.ru, May 18, 2006, as cited in Nikolai Sokov,
?Russia Weighing U.S. Plan to Put Non-
Nuclear Warheads on Long-Range Missiles,?
WMD Insights, June 2006, pp. 26?28, www
.wmdinsights.com.
14. Nabi Abdullaev, ?Russia Delays Joint
Exercise, Tests ICBMs,? Defense News, September
18, 2006, p. 4; ?Russian Defense Minister
Reports Successful ICBM Test-Launch,?
Mosnews.com, September 11, 2006.
15. ?Tu-160 Bomber to Remain Core of
Russian Long-Range Aviation,? RIA Novosti,
December 13, 2006.
16. Ibid.
17. ?Russian Strategic Bombers Launch Series
of Cruise Missiles,? Mosnews.com, August
24, 2006.
18. ?Russia Will Not Discuss its Nuclear
Weapons With U.S.?Official,? Mosnews.com
(ITAR-TASS), June 14, 2006.
19. An English translation of the paper
is available at, cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/
rusfed.htm.
20. Vladimir Putin, ?Annual Address to the
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,?
May 10, 2006, www.kremlin.ru/eng/.
ALL PHOTOS: CORBIS/JIM SUGAR
This site may contain copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in our efforts to advance understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues, etc. We believe this constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use', you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
Back to TVC in the news...