Agenda

- Welcome
- Technical Background
- Why Programmatic and not Site-Specific?
 - . The DEIC proc
- The PEIS process
- Commenting
- Workshop + Q&A
- Next Steps

Overview





Technical Background – Why the need for a Programmatic EIS?

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Plutonium Pits are the cores of thermonuclear weapons



Plutonium Aging as Motivation for New Production?



Plutonium aging is often cited as the driving force requiring production of all new pits but the national labs have shown no evidence that plutonium is a life-limiting component in nuclear weapons. UCS analysis supports this conclusion.

"Restoring the ability to produce plutonium pits for primaries will guard against the uncertainties of plutonium aging in today's stockpile and will allow new pit designs to be manufactured, *if necessary for future weapons*." [emphasis added]

DOE/EIS-0552, 1-7

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DOE/EIS-0552, 1-7

New pits from Los Alamos are, in fact, ONLY for *unnecessary* new weapons, not to take care of the stockpile we have.





Technical Concerns for PEIS Comments

The PEIS should demonstrate the viability of NNSA's long-term plans for waste management and storage, including contingencies.

The PEIS should address the engineering and safety controls being installed at Los Alamos and Savannah River to protect the public and the environment from worst-case accidents and potential release of hazardous material.

Administrative and engineering controls for worker safety and material handling should be explicitly outlined according to best-practices

Transportation risks, routes, and frequency of shipments should be transparently communicated for affected communities

Measures to address and remediate existing legacy waste at each site should be addressed with proposed timelines and methods.

New UCS Report Available for Further Background

Plutonium Pit Production

The Risks and Costs of US Plans to Build New Nuclear Weapons



Addresses the science, history, and human and environmental risks associated with pit production

Concise "Findings and Recommendations" provided for each chapter

Full report and executive summary: www.ucs.org/resources/plutonium-pit-production

Resumen en español: es.ucs.org/recursos/la-produccion-de-nucleos-de-plutonio

Why Programmatic and not site-specific?

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Why Programmatic and not site-specific?

All of these steps require multi-site coordination:

Material Processing

Waste Management

Qualification

Assembly

Transportation



Transportation of Plutonium – Pits and TRU Waste



Increased Transuranic Waste to WIPP

WIPP is located is located approximately 30 miles east of Amarillo in the Texas Panhandle. The facility is built 2,150 feet underground in a salt formation, making it the nation's only licensed repository of defense-related transuranic (TRU) waste.

WIPP is licenced only to accept legacy waste from nuclear weapons complex sites.

Plutonium pit production will result in new TRU waste generation.

The Government Accountability Office estimates "that TRU waste from reestablishing a plutonium pit production capability represents about 68 percent of DOE's total amount bound for WIPP beyond 2033"



The PEIS Process

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The PEIS Process



How to Provide Comments

Via Email:

Send to PitPEIS@nnsa.doe.gov

Put in email subject line: "2025-08140 (90 FR 19706) Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Plutonium Pit Production Scoping Public Comment."

Via Regular Mail:

Ms. Jade Fortiner, NEPA Document Manager National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Pit Production Modernization U.S. Department of Energy 1000 Independence Ave. SW Washington, DC 20585

- There are risks to the environment and communities
- Rushing to meet an arbitrary, unnecessary deadline heightens the risks for the workforce recruited to carry out complex, hazardous plutonium processing. LANL's plutonium facility has a troubling record of recent safety violations, worker exposure to plutonium, and fires and floods. The program there appears to have prioritized expediency and cost-savings over safety. This endangers the workforce and the local community —as well as the program itself should a significant accident occur.



The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

The only repository for transuranic (TRU) wastes is the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southern New Mexico. WIPP is already way oversubscribed for all of the possible TRU wastes that the Department of Energy and NNSA would like to send to it. *It is not clear where future TRU wastes from plutonium pit production will go in the long term.*



Plutonium pit production involves multiple sites across the nation and includes the transportation and disposal of hazardous and radioactive materials. The cumulative impacts from new facilities, transportation, and generation of waste must be considered for the anticipated lifespan of the project, which may be many decades.



New plutonium pit production is unnecessary. While publicly stated rationales for the program often emphasize a need to replace aging pits, the national laboratories have offered no evidence that the nation's existing pits are anywhere near the end of their service lives. Nor is the plutonium in those pits currently at risk of age-related failure that would reduce the safety, security, or reliability of present warhead designs.



- Although the NNSA is currently planning for two pit production facilities in Los Alamos and Savannah River, the PEIS should address the potential consequences should they need to rely on only one facility.
- The NNSA and DOE should consider an option where no new pits are produced, and efforts are focused on the stewardship of the present stockpile. Los Alamos could maintain sufficient capabilities to conduct pit aging studies and stockpile surveillance, rendering the second proposed production site at Savannah River unnecessary.



- In addition to the PEIS the NNSA and DOE should produce integrated cost and schedule projections for the project according to GAO recommendations.
- The Department of Energy and the NNSA must place a higher priority on the safety and well-being of workers and frontline communities.
- The PEIS should address remediating existing environmental harm and be transparent about the cumulative risks associated with pit production.



Next Steps

- Email with tool kit for commentary, including a link to the UCS report on plutonium pit production
- This training will be repeated on June 26th. Please share with those you know who may be interested
- Written comments are due by July 14th

If you have questions or need assistance:

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Savannah River Site Watch

